

## **‘The Violent Reproduction of The Weak State’: The Boko Haram Occupations of Northern Adamawa, A Study of The Dynamics and Impacts; 2010-2015.**

**Douglas Barnabas and Nathan A. Yakubu**

Department of History, Faculty of Arts, Adamawa State University, Mubi

[douglasbarnabas@gmail.com](mailto:douglasbarnabas@gmail.com), [yakubunathan2@gmail.com](mailto:yakubunathan2@gmail.com)

DOI: [10.56201/ajha.v9.no1.2025.pg47.63](https://doi.org/10.56201/ajha.v9.no1.2025.pg47.63)

### **Abstract**

*The Study examined the context of The Boko Harams's (BH's) Occupations of the Seven Local Government Council Areas of Northern Adamawa, namely; Madagali, Michika, Mubi North, Mubi South, Hong, Gombi, and Maiha, between 2010-2015. The Study situated the Context, the Nature, the Character, the Dimensions as well as the Dynamics of of the BH's Insurgencies in the Area under Study. The Study held that, a concoction, confluence and matrix of broad and specific Crises, coalesced, to enable the Occupations of the Areas by the BH's Insurgent Group, in the period under Study. Be that as it is, the Study identified these Crises as: The Crises of The State, The Crises of Governance, The Crises of Development, The Crises of Democracy and Democratization, The Crises of Poverty, The Crises of Security and Securitization, as well as The Broad and Specific Crises of The Economy, The Socio-Political Crises, amongst others, all considered as part and parcel of the broader and specific , as indeed, The Crises of The Existential realities of the social forces, combined to attract the spill overs of the Insurgencies in the Borno State Area, to engender and spurn The BH's Groups' Insurgencies, from The Borno State Area, the epicenter of the Insurrections and Insurgencies, to thus , draw the Northern Adamawa State Area, into the vortex of the Occupations. In other words, Violence, both Exported as well as Imported, into the Area of our Study, Northern Adamawa, were enabled by the long drawn Crises, as well as the everyday realities that coloured the lives of the social forces in the Area. The Study, however, concludes by stating that, the consequences of The BH's Occupations on The Area of the Study, had very far reaching consequences, and further unleashed an unimaginable Ramifications of Destructions, that have had far reaching, devastations for: Human Security, Safety, Peace, Governance, Democracy and Democratization, Inter-Governmental, Development, as well as, Inter-Group Relations, and social cohesion. Here in, is the Thrust of this paper.*

**Keywords:** *Boko Haram, Northern Adamawa, Insurgencies, Public Property, Private Properties, Nigerian Army, Borno State, Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), Occupations, Violence.*

### **Introduction**

The Implosions and surge in the Boko Haram's(BH's) Insurgencies in the Seven Local Governments Areas of: Madagali, Michika, Mubi North, and Mubi South, Hong, Gombi and Maiha Local Governments Areas, in the Northern Adamawa State Area, of Nigeria ,between 2010-215, was the spillovers of the BH's Groups' recurring circles of Violent Insurrections and Insurgencies campaigns in the Borno State Area, the consequence, of which have resulted in the incredible degrees of massive Devastations, Destructions and Disruptions, of both lives and properties alike: both Public and Private. It is, however, the resultant Destructions as well as the severe Large -Scale degrees of Devastations in the Areas of our Study, in the period of our Study, that this research papers seek to interrogate. Of instructive focus, nevertheless, is

the variegations as well as the nature and character of the Destructions, set in motion by the BH's carnages, that the paper seeks to situate, highlighting the immense degrees of negative implications of the Occupations, in magnifying the already existent and long evolved swathe of Crises, namely; Human Security, Safety, Peace, Governance, Democracy and Democratization, Inter-Governmental and International Group Relations, and Development, which have combined to exasperate, further, and amongst others, severe negative social cohesion, of various degrees and dimensions. This has, in turn, further, exasperated and magnified the already existent broad and specific negative Crises enablers dynamics, in the Area of Study.

It is, therefore, instructive to note here that, the same negative Crises spurning dynamics that had long plagued the Areas, and have, indeed, made the Areas profoundly prone and immensely susceptible to the Exportations and Importations of the Insurrectionists and Insurgences philosophies and activities, especially from the Borno State Area, in the first place, were the same broad and specific Crises magnifiers, engendered by the Groups' Occupations of the Area. In other words, the very same existential realities that existed in the Areas, have enabled the BH's Insurgencies and Insurrectionists activities, of plundering the Areas. These resultantly, have combined even further to both undermined and reversed, all the previous efforts to ensure that the Areas Governance, Security, and Development mechanisms, became Challenged.

This research paperwork is delineated into Six (6) Sections One (1), the Introduction situates the Etymologies of the Study. Section two (2), situates the Evolution and expansions of the BH' Insurgent Group, as well as of the philosophies, and indeed, of the drivers and the enablers of the spread. Also, of the cursory examinations of some of the Groups' activities. Section three (3), Examines the enablers, and the Dynamics of the BH's Occupations of Local Government Areas, making up the Northern Adamawa Area. Sections four (4) and five (5) provides some detailed and graphic statistics of the Destructions, of both public and private properties, alike, in the Areas of Study, between 2010-2015. Whilst, Section Six (6), is the conclusions.

### **The Evolution of the Boko Haram in Northern Adamawa**

There are divergent narratives on the emergence of Boko Haram (*Jamā'atu Ahl al-Sunnah Li Adda'awat wal Jihad*) this had made their origin shrouded with a lot of controversies. For instance, while Hansen held the view that the Group has its roots in the Maitasine uprising.<sup>1</sup> On his part, however, Mustapha Gwadabe<sup>2</sup> believed the group's emergence can be linked to the introduction of the Izala sect in Nigeria. Whilst Freedom Onuoha, and the intelligence community are of the view that their roots can be traced back to 1995, when Abubakar Lawan established the *Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra* or *Shabaab* group (Muslim Youth Organisation) in Maiduguri, Borno State<sup>3</sup>. Nevertheless, despite the divergent views amongst scholars and Researchers alike on the immediate and remote origins of the sect, there are high levels of consensus on the recent resurgences and expansions. Mohammed Kyari, however, provided more plausible narratives on the Groups' rise and Implosions. He was of the view that, the Groups' activities was first noticed, when it withdrew from Maiduguri, the Borno State Capital,

<sup>1</sup>For details see Hansen, W. W. et al "Poverty and Economic Deprivation Theory Street Children Qur'anic Schools/Almajirai and the Dispossessed as the sources of Recruitment for Boko Haram and other Religious, Political and Criminal Groups in Northern Nigeria" in *Perspective on Terrorism* Vol. 10 No. 5 October 2016. PP. 83-95. Also see. Douglad B. and Nadir A. N "A. Micro Analysis of the Activities of Boko Haram in North-Eastern Nigeria: A Case Study of Adamawa State, 2009-2015" *KIU Journal of Humanities* Kampala International University. 7(1) pp. 181-188, 2022. p. 181

<sup>2</sup>For more details see, Mustapha Gwadabe "Islam, Izala and Boko Haram Dispute in Northern Nigeria: A Historical Perspective" Department of History, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Seminar Series 15<sup>th</sup> October, 2014. see also, Douglad B. and Nadir A. N "A. Micro Analysis of the Activities of Boko Haram in North-Eastern Nigeria: A Case Study of Adamawa State, 2009-2015" ... p. 182

<sup>3</sup>Douglad B. and Nadir A. N "A. Micro Analysis of the Activities of Boko Haram in North-Eastern Nigeria: A Case Study of Adamawa State, 2009-2015"... p. 182

to a rural setting called, Kanama, in Yobe State in 2003. From this location, they launched several vicious attacks on Police Stations, and Government Buildings, whilst at the same time, wrecking debilitating havocs in the surrounding towns of Borno and Yobe States.<sup>4</sup>

Kyari, maintained that, there were Three (3) phases in the Evolution of the sect. The first phase according to him was the Kanama phase (2003-2005), when a Militant Jihadist Group called the Nigerian Taliban waged war on the Nigerian State, but was repelled with casualties on both sides. This group was led by Muhammad Ali.<sup>5</sup>

The second phase began with the collapse of the Kanama Group. This period was called the *Dawah* phase, which was devoted to intensive proselytization, the recruitment, the indoctrination and the radicalization of its members. The phase involved the extensive criticisms of the Nigerian state, secular system; debates, with opposing *Ulama* (clerics) on the propriety or otherwise, of Western Education, Westernization, democracy as well as secularism and criticisms of the corruption and Bad Governance under Governor Ali Modu Sheriff, (2003-2011) of Borno State, as well as, of the conspicuous opulence of the Elite in the amid of Poverty as.

The third phase according to Kyari began with the 2009 suppression of the Insurgencies', and the killing of its leader by Nigerian Security Agencies. This made the Boko Haram Insurgents to go underground and re-surfed, overtime, but this time, violently, for vengeance over the killing of the Group's leader.

This time they not only target their perceived opponents, but they generally attacked security officials, Politicians, as well as the Associates of the ruling All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), government in Borno State. Consequently, the Group, resorted to bombings. The Group Targeted, high profile targets in Abuja; such as the Nigerian Police Headquarters, as well as United Nations (UN) offices in June and August 2011 respectively.<sup>6</sup> It should be stated, here, again that; it was in the third phase that the Group first referred to itself as *Jama'a atu Allis-Sunnah Lidda' await wal Jihad*. This was after the prison break in Bauchi in September 2010.

Be that as it is, the evidence of the Groups' presence in Northern Adamawa State, can be traced to the *Dawah* phase between 2007 and 2008. Informants from Mubi North, Mubi South and the Madagali Local Government Areas<sup>7</sup> affirmed our claims. Though the specific date(s) could not be provided. Nevertheless, research findings opined that, the Implosions of the BH's' Militants Insurgencies and Insurrectionists activities, coincided with Muhammed Yusuf's fleeting visits to Mubi, Shuwa and Duhu Districts, even before the lunch of the violent Insurrectionists Jihad. From where, he preached to his followers. According to informants, Muhammed Yusuf preached at *Masallachin Bolla* and *Masallachin Shagari* at Low Cost. He was reported to have visited Mubi more than ten times. His visits no doubt paid off and attracted a large number of followers. This is to the extent that, some followers burnt their certificates whilst others left their various trades to join the Group. It was said that the Group had members in almost all the neighbourhood of Mubi. It should be mentioned that one Sani Jangal and Alhaji Adamu America were the well-known members and financiers of the Group in Mubi. The former was said to have donated his House to the Group which was used as MARKAS

---

<sup>4</sup>Douglad B. and Nadir A. N "A. Micro Analysis of the Activities of Boko Haram in North-Eastern Nigeria: A Case Study of Adamawa State, 2009-2015" .... p. 182

<sup>5</sup>He is a Nigerian who was believed to have been radicalised by jihadi literature in Saudi Arabia and was believed to have fought alongside the *mujahideen* in Afghanistan.

<sup>6</sup>Douglad B. and Nadir A. N "A. Micro Analysis of the Activities of Boko Haram in North-Eastern Nigeria: A Case Study of Adamawa State, 2009-2015" ...p. 182

<sup>7</sup> These local governments were said to have more members of the group than the others. In fact, it was reported that, it was these members that were mobilised to carry out their operations in the state.

(Ibn Taymiyyah Centre)<sup>8</sup>. In Mubi, for instance, it was revealed that most of those that joined the Group were mostly of the Blue collared professionals, namely; tailors, mechanics, bakers and small businessmen, but to mention a few. Even though, no reason(s) were given, as to why it was these classes of persons that joined, the Group.

Mallam Iliyasu Usman, a former member of the Group in Shuwa District, revealed that their members were mostly; drivers, tailors, and businessmen. They, were mostly made up of youths between twenty (25) to twenty-eight (28) years of age. Similarly, another informant in Mubi, puts the ages of the recruits, to be between twenty-four (24) to thirty first (35) years of age. He further revealed that Muhammed Yusuf usually preached in three (3) areas of the town, around the neighborhoods of Mallam Idrisu; a former commissioner in the Second Republic and in Wuro Fulbe.<sup>9</sup> It should be here again stated that Mubi North and Mubi South, as well as Madagali, (LGAs) were the main bases of the Group, from whence they mobilised and carried out their recruitment. Here, again were the grounds where they carried out their operations. It was revealed that during the 2009, in the battle between the Army and the Group in Maiduguri, the Sects members were mobilized from these places and deployed, in about five (5), Eighteen (18)-Seater-Buses, to convey members from Mubi alone.<sup>10</sup> The expansion of the Groups' activities into Northern Adamawa can be linked to their dislodgements from urban areas, and especially in Borno and Yobe States. This development led to the establishment of three (3) camps, from where their activities were hardly noticed, i.e. the Sambisa Forest, the Kirenowa and the Abadam camps. It was from these three (3) Hideouts secretly they arranged for, and executed their mindless, dastardly, vicious and ferocious attacks on the Northern Adamawa.<sup>11</sup>

The questions begging for answers are that, why would graduates tear their Certificates and abandon their various careers to join the group? The answers to these questions, are in two folds. First, is the personal quality of Muhammed Yusuf, who was described as a "gifted demagogue and persuasive debater" with a charismatic style of preaching that could convince prospective recruits and foot soldiers.<sup>12</sup> He was said to have exploited the vulnerabilities of people, through the provisions start-up capitals, for petty businesses as providing economic benefits to members.

Finally, through his sermons, he promised a 'just society' when Sharia replaces the current forms of governments. With these, he tapped into the very emotions of the weak and vulnerable persons. Also, through his 'Messianic' messages, he manipulated the emotions of the largely disadvantaged populations, who were faced with the everyday existential realities, as well as other swathes of Crises, earlier mentioned in this work. These were the 'Eldorados', that appealed to the poor and powerless many. The socioeconomic dis-affections that many saw worth dying for.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>8</sup>MARKAS was their headquarter and base, where they host their visitors and indoctrinate their followers. Interview with Abdulakeem Muhammed, 30 years, trader Mubi South, 26<sup>th</sup> February, 2020 and Alhaji Ali Yakamata, 56 years, Businessman, Bauchi, 29<sup>th</sup> February, 2020. Alhaji Yakamata was a victim of Boko Haram, he was forced to relocate to Bauchi because he lost everything he had worked for over 40 years in Mubi.

<sup>9</sup>Interview with Mallam Iliyasu Usman 37 years, Driver in Shuwa District, 10 October, 2019.

<sup>10</sup> Interview with Abdulakeem Muhammed, 30 years, trader Mubi South, 26<sup>th</sup> February, 2020.

<sup>11</sup> Kyari M. "The Origin of Boko Haram" in A. Carl levan and Patrick Utaka ed. *The Oxford Handbook of Nigeria Politics*: United Kingdom, Oxford University Press, 2018. PP. 583-604 P. 598

<sup>12</sup>Abubakar K. M. and Ibrahim U. "Why Borno? The History, Geography and Sociology of Islamic Radicalization" in Abdul Raufu M. and Kate M. ed. *Overcoming Boko Haram: Faith, Society and Islamic Radicalization in Northern Nigeria*: Abuja, Premium Times Books, 2020. PP. 64-90 P. 82

<sup>13</sup>Abubakar K. M. and Ibrahim U. "Why Borno? The History, Geography and Sociology of Islamic Radicalization..." P.78



### **The Boko Haram's Occupations of Northern Adamawa**

The period under review was characterized by the intensification of BH's drive to Occupy territories in our Areas of Study. The period, however, preceded the gradual military engagements in cities, especially in Maiduguri, their main base, before they moved to the Sambisa Forest and rural areas.

The Group acquired territories, seamlessly and without resistance. The Areas were essentially ungoverned. The Group achieved these, through the means of violence, and threats of the use of force and violence. The Group also brought several communities under their control. That way, they occupied the whole of Southern Borno towns of Chibok, Damboa, and Gwoza to mention a few.

According to Alexander Thuston, three (3), triggered these series of Occasions. First, were the Nigerian Military intensifications of the anti-insurgency campaigns against BH Group, in the several cities of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States, following the declaration of the State of Emergency, by The Federal Government, in these States. The second was the emergence of Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in these States that helped the military in no small measure in identifying the various BH members in their various localities. These developments enabled the ease of identifications of those considered to be the members of the BH Group, who in turn, fled the said urban cities and poured out into the countrysides. Here, as the character of the Insurgent Group, exploited the both the weak and the near non-existent Governance mechanisms, as well as the, existential realities, and social-economic vulnerabilities in the Areas, to annex territories.<sup>14</sup> Here in, are the contexts from and within which the Occupations of Northern Adamawa, could be better appreciated.

This brings us to a claim that Mubi Areas was overran without any military resistance. The proponents of this positions believed that since there was no military engagement within Mubi towns, before the Occupations, meant that there were internal collaborators within the military. This was because soldiers were seen taking off their uniforms and hiding their weapons and disposing anything that could identify them as soldiers.<sup>15</sup> However, it should be noted that the success recorded by the BH in southern Borno was the propellers that motivated them to advance to the Areas in Northern Adamawa, to acquire and extend the territories to establish their supposed caliphate. More importantly, the successes recorded in Gwoza, where the BH did not only overpower the military, but also acquired more abandoned weapon,<sup>16</sup> provided the Group with the needed moral to advance to Madagali. The closest town (LGA) in Northern Adamawa Area. In other words, from Gwoza, the Group invaded Madagali in the early hours of 23rd August, 2014.

Here again, the insurgents dislodged the military at the LG's secretariat where the soldiers were stationed. The group advanced into the town with over one hundred of the members led by an Armoured Vehicle, seized in Gwoza. And after the heavy gun battles with BH Group, the Nigerian military retreated. After this, the Group hoisted their flags in the Administrative Headquarters of the LGA. Thus making the LGA, the first LGA to fall under the control of BH in Northern Adamawa State.<sup>17</sup>

The Occupations of Madagali was characterized by widespread killings, kidnappings, destructions and the lootings of both public and private properties, alike. This made many

<sup>14</sup> Alexander T. *Boko Haram: The History of An African Jihadist Movement* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018. p. 196

<sup>15</sup> This was the dominant view of informants which most victims confirmed. Usman Mohammed Asarya, 49 Years, Exmember of BH, Madagali, 11/10/24, Kabiru Salmana, 43 years, Exmember of BH, Madagali, 12/10/24 See also <sup>15</sup> Bleambo P. K. and Lagu S. A. (ed.) *Mubi Exodus October 29<sup>th</sup> 2014: Adamawa State University Experience. Mubi*. Unpublished Manuscript. P. 66

<sup>16</sup> <http://www.saharareporters.com/2014/08/23boko-haram-insurgents-overrun-madagali-local-government-adamawa-state>. Retrieved 8<sup>th</sup> September, 2024

<sup>17</sup> <http://leadership.ng/news/381881/boko-haram-takes-madagali-adamawa-villages>. Accessed 14<sup>th</sup> September, 2024.

residents to flee the town to a safer place. It was at this time that Usman Mohammed Asarya and others joined the BH.<sup>18</sup> Some sought refuge in Mubi, Michika, Gombi and Yola. Whilst others went outside the State. Meanwhile, there were close to over four (4) thousand Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), who sought refuge in Madagali from Gwoza, and other parts of Southern Borno, that were again displaced, by the Groups' Occupations of the Northern Adamawa Areas.

Meantime, intelligence reports from Madagali to Michika, Mubi and beyond showed that Madagali has been conquered. The news brought fears to people who got the news.

Similarly, soldiers at the battlefield started calling those they knew in Mubi and Michika to leave the towns before BH advanced to where they were. Such news was received by the then Acting Vice Chancellor of Adamawa State University Mubi, Dr Moses Zaruwa which made him close the school officially.<sup>19</sup>

One significant pattern of BH conquest and Occupations, was that the Group success, always added weapons to their arsenals. Arsenals abandoned and captured from the fleeing Nigerian military.

In Madagali alone, the BH Group captured six (6) Armoured Tanks. These were, in addition to, other military hardwares. However, it was only two of the tanks that made it to Gulak town as the Nigerian Air Force' Alpha-Jets, destroyed four (4) on their way to Gulak.<sup>20</sup> Just like Madagali, Gulak fell by 4 pm on 3rd September, 2014. Being the last town in Madagali LGA to be occupied.

Four days later, precisely on 7th September, the BH Group attacked Michika from Gulak. A distance of only some Kilometres away. In the meantime, as early as the first week of August, the insurgents were cited in Bazza a major town, in Michika LGA, advancing to the Mubi Area. This development had brought panic to the residents of Mubi. This was to further lead to the first exodus from Mubi, as well as the closure of educational institutions in Mubi, as earlier noted. However, owing to the security tip-off by the then JTF commander in Mubi, a four week closure of the State owned, institution the was closed down, and then, reopened: (Adamawa State University) on 27th August, 2014 due to the security reports received from the military. The Reports had it that the military prevented the BH from getting access to Mubi because they blew the Bazza-Uba bridge. This act had hindered the Group from occupying Mubi earlier than they did.

The period between the first and second exodus was characterized by fear, false alarm and high rate of robbery and burglary. Houses, shops and offices were burgled and robbed by close or distant neighbours who stayed back. There were reports of how some people identified their properties in the hands of neighbours.<sup>21</sup>

On the eve of the Occupations of Mubi, there were increased sounds of gunfire and shelling coming from Bazza axis. Meanwhile, after the fall of Michika and Madagali, soldiers were mobilised from Uba, Marara Mubi and Mubi town to liberate the occupied LGAs. After hours of heavy gun battles with BH, the military retreated according to a report. This was due to the superior weapons of the BH Group, when compared with those of the Nigerian Military. So, it was easy to overwhelm those who were at checkpoints in Uba, Hildi and others.<sup>22</sup>

Thus, within a short time and without resistance, the BH Group gained access to Mubi and brought it under the Groups' control on 29th October, 2014. This development led to the

<sup>18</sup> Usman Mohammed Asarya, 49 years, Exmember, Madagali, 11/10/2024.

<sup>19</sup> Bleambo P. K. and Lagu S. A. (ed.) *Mubi Exodus October 29<sup>th</sup> 2014: Adamawa State University Experience. Mubi*. Unpublished Manuscript. :... P. 76

<sup>20</sup> <http://leadership.ng/news/381881/boko-haram-takes-madagali-adamawa-villages>. Accessed 14<sup>th</sup> September, 2024.

<sup>21</sup> Ishaku Amos Melaluwa, 53 Years, Civil Servant, Wuro Patuji-Mubi. 27/01/2023

<sup>22</sup> Bleambo P. K. and Lagu S. A. (ed.) *Mubi Exodus October 29<sup>th</sup> 2014: Adamawa State University...* P. 66

invitation of the Military Commander in Mubi Lt. Col. O. A. Agwu and his Soldiers to Yola for questioning on the cause for the abandonment of the battles, by the soldiers. It was, however, reported at the time that, there were three (3) army battalions in Mubi when the unfortunate event took place. The army groups were: 234 Battalion, 213 Battalion and the 21-Support Group.<sup>23</sup>

It is important to note that the Occupations of Northern Adamawa State began with the collapse of Madagali LGA and ends with the collapse of Mubi. This development made it easier to capture Maiha, Hong and Gombi LGAs. Madagali was the first to fall in the State, which in turn gave the way, and made it easier for others to fall. While the fall of Mubi was strategic. The town reputed for being the commercial town and nerve center in the state and the capital of the Northern Senatorial District.

This was a morale booster for the insurgents to further advanced to other LGAs. Considering the easy access, they had in occupying Mubi.

As noted earlier, words were coming from soldiers at the battleground to friends and acquaintances advised them to leave Mubi. This development received the widest publicity it needed. This led to the mass exodus people from the town. The aftereffects of which resulted in heavy traffics and logjams, as the residents tried to leave the towns. And since the Mubi-Mararaba Road was no longer safe, commuters took the alternative routes, available, being the Mubi-Maiha Road. Those who plied through these routes saw the soldiers packing their belongings and military wares retreating further. The military was later seen in Mararaba-Pella in Hong LGA. Also, other commuters emigrated to the Cameroon Republic from where they were rescued. Stories of this episode are too numerous to mention.<sup>24</sup>

It should be emphasized that, the conquests and Occupations of towns were done simultaneously. The first place they attacked when they entered Mubi was the Prison, where they released some of their members. Next was the residence of the Emir of Mubi, which was about five hundred meters (500) metres away from the prison. Then Mubi North Divisional Police Headquarters located in Garden City. After which they hosted their flags symbolising their control of the town, while patrolling freely. They assembled residents informing them of the change in Government, and the introduction of the *sharia* law and even asking them to stay back and go about their normal businesses.

Informants had it that the leaders always held *Tafsir* sessions (preaching) through interpretation of the Holy Quran after the *Morning Isha* prayers admonishing residents not to leave and explaining the need to join hands and fight for the cause of Allah. And usually after the early morning prayers, they charged residents to go and do the work of Allah by fighting the Jihad. This made many residents flee the towns at night time. There were reported cases of how people were punished according to the dictates of the *Shari'a* law. Some were said to have been amputated, while others were flogged strokes of canes according to their offence.<sup>25</sup>

Just like in Mubi, the insurgents invaded Michika on the night of 7th September, 2014 around 11 pm. They first attacked the Police station and then the House of the District Head of Michika which became the residence of their Amir. The next morning, they went to the central Mosque where they assembled all residents, made announcements that they were in charge, and commenced operations. They attacked the Banks, burnt Houses of especially Christians, Churches, Hotels, Business premises, and Schools, and killed several people who could not recite any verse of the Quran. However, most of the Churches and Mosques that were not

---

<sup>23</sup> Ibid p. 42

<sup>24</sup> For more on this see Bleambo P. K. and Lagu S. A. (eds.) Mubi Exodus October 29<sup>th</sup> 2014: Adamawa State University...

<sup>25</sup> Usman Mohammed Asarya, 49 years, Exmemeber, 11/10/24, Hadiza Dala'ilu, 38 years, Business Woman, Mubi South, 12/02/2024 see also Ibid p. 57

destroyed were used as warehouses, where looted properties were kept.<sup>26</sup> There was the case of one Alex, who could recite some verses of the Holy Quran, as a result of his mingling with his Muslim friends. He was spared. Also, there were cases of Muslims who were killed for not being able to recite the Holy Quran. Meanwhile, they were receiving briefs from some of the Groups' foot soldiers; Bana and Mendi. Two (2) members of the Groups, and internal collaborators in the town.<sup>27</sup>

There were different versions of how various people escaped the BH's onslaught. While, some who had earlier fled from villages in Gwoza, Madagali and Michika to sought refuge in Mubi, Hong and Gombi, and for which they were already IDPs, they were later displaced from their place of refuge. These were unprecedented Human crises. The situations were so dire, such that they enabled several other Human crises, as consequences.

According to reports<sup>28</sup>, lots of people died on the way. Some were abandoned. Pregnant women gave birth. While sick and aged people, who could not walk for hours, were either left to die or were saved by those who could. Many were missing, especially children. It was established that no fewer than three hundred and fifty (350) Children were reportedly missing after the take-over of Mubi, owing to the fact that there were at school when the incident occurred.<sup>29</sup> Also, people abandoned their cars for lack of fuel or for the faults they developed, on the way. People slept in the open field with no water, no toilet, no food, no Medicare, before arriving at safety. On arrival at safety, they were faced with severe other challenges, ranging from livelihoods, shelters, sanitation and hygiene's. To remedy some of these challenges they simply adapted to some other survival strategies. One of such strategies was occupying uncompleted and abandoned buildings and engaging in all kinds of menial jobs among others<sup>30</sup>, as means for survival.

Similarly, there were several versions of experiences witnessed in an attempt to escape from BH's Occupations. However, the story lines seemed the same. The implications of the take over and Occupations of these towns and villages were devastating, frustrating and uncertain. They brought about untold hardships, and even made many homeless. Whilst some lost their sources of livelihoods, others lost their loved ones. Some became widows, widowers and orphans. The results of these were severe humanitarian crises, that were only next and fitting in descriptions to of those of the Nigerian civil war. The first few weeks of the displacements were characterized by lots of confusions and despairs. The concerns for those that fled their Homes at the time, were to get to safe Havens. Some fled to Cameroon, whilst the others to Yola, the state capital, from where they were dispersed to other safe havens.

### **The Destructions on Private Properties**

As mentioned earlier, on the 23rd of August, 2014, Madagali LGA fell to Boko Haram. Much in the same way the dreaded Insurgents Group, Michika LGA, on September 8. Similarly, the Group took control of Mubi North and Mubi South LGAs, on 29th October. Likewise, Maiha LGA, fell to Boko Haram on the 10th of November, whilst Gombi and Hong fell on the 15th of November, respectively. However, four (4) days after, precisely on the 19<sup>th</sup>, November, 2014, the military announced that it had recaptured Gombi and Hong LGAs. Equally, on 8th December, the military, in collaboration with other Security Agencies recaptured Mubi North

<sup>26</sup> Usman Mohammed Asarya, 49 years, Exmember, Madagali.11/10/24, Kabiru Salmana, 43 years, Exmember, Madagali, 12/10/24

<sup>27</sup> Interview with Baba Abubakar 36 years, staff of FRSC an indigene of Michika, Mubi 11/07/2023

<sup>28</sup> Bleambo P. K. and Lagu S. A. (eds.) *Mubi Exodus October 29<sup>th</sup> 2014*:...P. 59

<sup>29</sup> Ibid p. 59

<sup>30</sup> Bleambo P. K. and Lagu S. A. (eds.) *Mubi Exodus October 29<sup>th</sup> 2014*... p. 47



and Mubi South. Babalaba Isa and Modu Kundiri were Commanders that led the BH's troops that captured Madagali, Michika, Mubi North and South LGAs; respectively.<sup>31</sup> The patterns of the Occupations in these Areas suggested that, a particular Group moved in and conquered an area, then advanced to the next LGA, while the Amir and other members settled in the conquered area. It should be noted that there was no evidence to suggest that different commanders were assigned LGAs to conquer. The first thing the Group did was to attack security Base, attack Prisons to free the Groups' members, and then moved on to attack the Palaces of Emirs or District Heads, from where they Housed the leader of the Group. This had been their patterns and sequences of engagements<sup>32</sup>. The testaments of these sheer degrees of violence and destructions are evidenced from the unprecedented levels of the destructions on public properties, here in, discussed below.

Be that as it is, both Mubi North and Mubi South, were the Local Government Areas, that came under the controls and Occupations by the Insurgent Group. The BH from 29th October, to 8th December, 2014. On the other hand, Gombi and Hong Local Government Areas, were captured on 15th November, and again were re-captured on 19th November, 2014, by the Nigerian Military. This was less than a week under the control of the Areas by the Group. Similarly, Madagali LGA and Michika were re-captured on 12<sup>th</sup> of March and 29th January. This was right after the Group initially took over these LGAs on 23rd August 2014 and 8th September, 2014, respectively.

In specific terms, Madagali which was the first to be captured in the State, was under the control of the Group for about seven months, and Michika, the second to fall, was under the control of the Group for five (5) Months.

The periods of BH Occupations as indicated above was characterized by lootings, killings, displacements of person, the Arsons of Houses and Business premises. However, the duration of occupation vary from one LGA and community to the other. Also, the durations of the Occupations were not only what determined the levels of destructions in these places. Other factors like the ferocity of the attacks, the proximity, (of the towns and villages), to their camps and the battle grounds, from where the military engagements and operations against the Group. Another interesting factor, that explained the degree of violence in the patterns of attacks, was based on the fact that one or more of the Sects members or internal collaborators were from the respective specific communities. Thus, the internal collaborators would want to 'liberate it for Allah'.<sup>33</sup> This could also determine the extent and ferocity of attacks on such a community. These Group members were the internal collaborators, who showed them round the towns, and thus identified those Houses, that were to be attacked, damaged, burnt or looted.<sup>34</sup> This shows that the attacks were premeditated, calculated and organized. The victims, were also targeted, and not randomly attacked. According to one District Head, they only looted Houses where were aware that the owners were well-off and influential. He, however, identified one of such internal collaborators as, Usman Mohammed Menjo. He moved around with the Insurgent Groups' members, to help identify such targeted Houses. He was singled out as the one who drove around the Hilux vehicle used to loot the properties. However, this is not to mean that they were no collateral damage. What follows here are the summaries of the overall impacts of BH's operations and Occupations in the primarily affected States in the North-East Region of Nigeria, as well as the properties destroyed.

<sup>31</sup> Prince Zubeiru Ali Ijafaru, 49 years, District Head of Chakawa, Mubi, 20/02/2023, Umaru Mohammed Asarya, 49 years, Exmember of BH, Madagali, 11/10/2024

<sup>32</sup> Baba Abubakar, 36 years, FRSC, Mubi, 11/07/2023 see also Bleambo P. K. and Lagu S. A. (eds.) *Mubi Exodus October 29<sup>th</sup> 2014...* p. 24

<sup>33</sup> Interview with Muhammed Kyari, 57 years, Academic Arewa House Kaduna, 10/03/2020

<sup>34</sup> Interview with Prince Zubeiru Ali Ijafaru 49 Years, District Head of Chakawa, Mubi, 19/02/2023

In the period studied, an estimated number of five thousand, three hundred and nine (5369) units of Houses were reportedly affected by the Boko Haram Insurgencies and Occupations, in the Seven Local Government Areas of the State. Table 1 provides the breakdown of the number of Houses so affected in the Seven LGAs, indicating the number of blocks and mud Houses as well as the number of rooms.

**Table 1: The Number of Reported and Affected Houses in the Seven Primary LGAs, in Northern Adamawa, 2014-2015:**

S/N	LGA	No. of Houses	No. of Block Houses	No. of Mud Houses	No. of Rooms	Remarks
1	Madagali	1668	215	895	3197	90% of the houses were burnt and 10% were looted and vandalised
2	Michika	1290	520	770	2177	87% of the houses were burnt, 13% were damaged.
3	Mubi North	1062	432	630		92% of the houses were looted, 3% vandalised and 5% burnt.
4	Mubi South	317	153	164		Most of the houses were looted and damaged.
5	Hong	500	254	246	1218	1218 rooms for 256 houses. Majority of the houses were burnt.
6	Gombi	478	17	87	1035	94% of the houses were burnt.
7	Maiha	26	16	10		21 out of the 26 houses were burnt.
<b>Total</b>		<b>5369</b>	<b>1607</b>	<b>2802</b>	<b>7,627</b>	

**Source:** Fieldwork.

While Northern Adamawa State is the third most affected State, in terms of the number of Houses destroyed in the North-East Region, Table.1 also provides the patterns, the variegations and varietizations of the affected Houses in the Seven affected LGAs in the State. Specifically, Houses were burnt, looted, vandalized and damaged, in these LGAs.

The most affected was Madagali LGA. The most primarily affected LGA with a total of 31% Houses, out of the total of 5369 Houses, and 50% of 6409 rooms in the affected LGAs. Duhu District was the worst hit amongst the Districts in Madagali LGA, having 31% out of the total houses destroyed, and 12% of the total number of rooms. Hong LGA recorded the highest amongst the secondary affected LGAs, with a total of 9% of affected houses.

Similarly, an average of 89% of affected Houses in the five (5) LGAs of Madagali, Michika, Gombi, Hong and Maiha, were burnt. Whilst the remaining 11% were either looted, damaged or vandalized. However, in Mubi North and Mubi South LGAs, 90% of the Houses were looted. Most of the looted Houses were in the main towns, especially in wards like; Lokuwa and Kolere

in Mubi North and Nasarawo and Gude wards in Mubi South. The identified burnt properties were inwards located in the rural areas like Mayo Bani and Betso in Mubi North and Duvu and Nduku wards in Mubi South. It was observed that, the most affected LGAs were Madagali and Michika, as both indicated in the table above, and the graphical representations, below.

These buildings were affected in a number of ways. As some were completely burnt, others were partially burnt. Whilst some others were vandalized, and were looted.

For instance, in one of the attacks on Bazza District in Michika LGA in July 2013, Sixty (60) Houses, were affected and forty-seven(47) of them were outrightly burnt down. The others were damaged. In the same Michika LGA, in September 2014, in one such attacks, one hundred and thirty-six (136) Houses were affected. Almost all were completely burnt down across the five (5) villages of Michika I, Mukava, Chitta, Tumbaka and Ngabali village.<sup>35</sup>

In the same way, within the period of BH Occupations of Mubi North about two hundred and sixty-two (262) Houses were said to have been burnt down. While the rest were damaged.<sup>36</sup> A total number of three hundred and twenty-five (325) Houses were destroyed across six (6) villages of: (Bawhona, Sabongari, Tela Bala, Guyaku Police station, Guyaku Clinic and Kakwara), in Gombi LGA, on the 27<sup>th</sup> February, 2015.<sup>37</sup>

Some of the victims whose Houses were burnt in Mubi North included: Dominic Datsada, Kiliya Sini Kwabe, Babangida Mohammed, Alh. Abdulkarim Musa (Yelwa Ward). Pius Jarada, Modibbo Haruna, Hon. Gabriel Richard (Lokuwa Ward). Those in Gombi LGA include; Ardo Saidu Tafida, Jespa S. Balna Dahiru Hamman (Balwhona Village) Teman Zakariya, Danzaria Maina, Barnabas Benaiah, Nathaniel Usman, and Joseph Ardo (Sabongari Guyaku). Victims in Madagali LGA were: Mombo Mbutha, Emthe Mulwa, Gawon Kuduta, Thodo Mazeme (Wagga Village). In Wuro Gayandi Village, those affected were: Emmanuel Uranda, Stephen Vandi Kwasha, Ijubula Mallam and Gabriel Urra. In Sukur village, the victims were: Fidelis Putunga, Andrawus Barka, Bulus Damda, Mara Tiagama and Kwanyé Titus.<sup>38</sup>

The reasons were that, these three (3) LGAs were closer to Borno State (than the other LGAs), the epicentre of the Insurgencies. The proximities to our Areas of Study to Borno State, the most affected LGAs (Damboa and Gwoza) in southern Borno as well as the Sambisa forest<sup>39</sup> where the main camp of the Group was said to be located, overwhelmingly contributed to the destructions.

The implications of these can be seen in the forceful displacements of people of these Areas. The victims were mostly women and children, who were vulnerable to different forms of abuses. While many others lost their shelters, and accesses to land. The figures indicate that there were more members of the Boko Haram Insurgencies Group, in Madagali and Michika than in other LGAs. The coordinated patterns of attacks and arsons were carefully orchestrated, and guided by the members of the Group, who belonged to the LGAs and who had the responsibilities to 'redeem' the rest of the community, and lead them to the path of 'salvation'. In Mubi town for instance, Houses were only looted, perhaps, because it was the "Medinatu Islam", the alleged capital of the caliphate. Here the people were admonished to stay back and abide by the rules. Studies found out that the lootings were not only done by Boko Haram alone, but were coordinated, in cahoot with some criminal elements that decided to stay back.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>35</sup> ADSEMA: Properties Destroyed by Boko Haram in Michika Vol. 1 2015

<sup>36</sup> ADSEMA: Mubi North LGA Those Affected by Boko Haram Insurgency

<sup>37</sup> ADSEMA: Guyaku Insurgency Attack in Gombi LGA February 2015.

<sup>38</sup> ADSEMA: Mubi North LGA Those Affected by Boko Haram Insurgency

<sup>39</sup>The Sambisa Forest was gazette as a Game Reserve by Borno State Government in 1981, with an area of about 520 sq. km (128,500 acres) cutting across a number of LGAs in Borno and Adamawa State.

<sup>40</sup> Interview with Usman Musa 52 years, Trader, Mubi South 02/05/2018

### **The Destructions of Public Properties**

The most targeted buildings by the insurgents were public buildings, especially, government offices and quarters. This probably was because they indicated the presence of governments, which the Group had wanted to eliminate at all costs. This partly explains why they attacked Police stations and barracks, customs barracks, military barracks, prisons, Local Government Headquarters. These were in addition to offices and Palaces of Districts Heads as well as the House of the Emir of Mubi. This can be understood as their effort to usurp powers, and establish the Groups' Authorities in the affected areas. Besides the aforementioned, other Public buildings affected were Markets, Churches and Mosques. The rationale behind these attacks were not different from the above.

The number of Public Buildings according to the fieldwork can be seen in Table 2. The total of over two hundred and sixty five (265) buildings were identified. Seven Markets, two hundred and nine (209) Churches, Sixteen(16) Mosques and Thirty-three (33) Government Buildings made up of: Residential Quarters, Barracks and Offices.

With regards to the markets, in the seven (7) affected LGAs of the State, Six(6) were in Madagali LGA, and the remaining one (1) was in Mubi North. Of the Six (6) markets affected in Madagali, two (2) were main markets, while the remaining four(4) were local markets. Since Madagali LGA is closer to Borno and the Camps of the BH's insurgents, the Area was prone to the Insurrectionists attacks when they were in need of food supply and other Household items. The one market affected in Mubi North was the Mubi Main market. The market attracted peoples as far as the Central Africa Republic. Not to mention Cameroun and the surrounding towns and villages, of which the total of over ninety (90) shops were said to have been looted in the market.<sup>41</sup>

With regards to Churches, seventy-two (72) of the affected Churches constituting 34% of two hundred and nine Churches affected were in Mubi South LGA.

Madagali and Michika Local Government Areas, were third on the list with twenty-five (25) Churches each. Gombi had seventeen (17), Maiha two (2), and Hong one (1) . Mubi South had the highest number of Churches probably because Mubi is a cosmopolitan town with a high population density which had a good number of Pentecostal Churches. This contrast with Madagali, Michika, and Maiha Local Government Areas, which had more Orthodox Churches. They were usually bigger than the Pentecostal Churches, that were scattered all over in densely populated towns. This partly explains why more churches were affected in Mubi.

The pattern of attacks of Churches were such that, the internal collaborators described, showed and or pointed at the locations of the Churches, before they were attacked and since the Insurrectionists and Insurgents knew nothing of the said towns, they enjoyed the the luxuries of being taken on Guided missions, to launch attacks. This explains why no Church in Muchalla<sup>42</sup> was attacked. Since they were predominantly Christians.<sup>43</sup> It can, however, also be argued that, since Mubi was the alleged capital of the Caliphate, it was out of place to have a good number of Churches in a town that were supposedly an 'Islamic' one.

To this end, it is safe to argue here that, there were deliberate policies to get rid of anything that represented Christianity in the town. Moreover, the burning of Houses or buildings in Mubi were uncommon, owing to the cosmopolitan nature.

Similarly, Gombi LGA was the most affected among the SAL (secondary affected LGA) with seventeen Churches (17) affected, constituting 8% of the 209 churches affected in the State.

<sup>41</sup> ADSEMA: Final Report on Destruction in Adamawa State.

<sup>42</sup> Is a town located at the suburb of Mubi.

<sup>43</sup> Interview with Ishaku Amos Melaluwa 53 Years, Civil Servant, Wuro Patuji, Mubi South, 28/01/2023



**Table 2: The Affected Public Properties in the Northern Adamawa Areas:**

S/N	LGA	No. of Markets	No. of Churches	No. of Mosques	No. of Govt. Offices/ Quarters	Remarks
1	Madagali	6	25	3	3	LG Secretariat, Two Development Areas Offices. Two main markets and four local markets, Sukur World Heritage Site, 1 Bank
2	Michika		25	2	5	One local govt. secretariat, Three Development Area Offices and AADP store house, 3 Banks
3	Mubi North	1	67	8	2	Prison and Palace of the Emir of Mubi. Over ninety shops were looted in the market.
4	Mubi South	-	72	1	1	Chairman's lodge
5	Hong	-	1	1	9	8 Banks LGA Secretariat, LG Quarters Youth Centre, FERMA Office 1 Bank etc.
6	Gombi	-	17		8	Prison, District Head's Office and Palace, grain store, fertilizer store, 1 Bank etc.
7	Maiha	-	2	1	6	LG Quarters, Presidential Lodge, Chairman's House, Youth Plaza, District Head's Office and Palace.
<b>Total</b>		7	209	16	34	

**Source: The Adamawa State Emergency Management Agency**

The total number of Mosques affected in the period under study were sixteen(16); that being 7.6%, compared to the Two Hundred and Nine (209) Churches affected. It is also more than ten (10) times the affected number of Churches in Mubi South LGA alone.

Clearly It was this evidence that provided the insight into interpreting whole episodes with a religious garb and colorations. Even though, it was difficult to argue otherwise, owing to the

burdens of the evidences available, the developments have, however, appeared to have continually enjoyed the luxury of religious narratives and interpretations.

The implications of this are that, it had further strained the already fragile relationships between Muslims and Christians in the Areas of Study, indeed created the ill feelings between them to the extent that the Christians believed that the Muslims had foreknowledge of the attacks, and that some of them even took part,<sup>44</sup> in them. These developments have further ruptured whatever is left of the tenuous relationships they had had amongst themselves. The seminal evidences, being the separate markets between the once healthy relationship.: Saturday for Christian and Sunday for Muslims.<sup>45</sup>

Mubi North alone accounted for 50% of the total Mosques affected in the area of Study. This can be explained in two ways. First, it can be said that these Mosques were the ones associated with the insurgents, and thus were destroyed by the Military. Also, the insurgents could have destroyed these Mosques, and perhaps the worshippers and Imams, but restrained themselves, this could be could have elicited criticisms of them, and of their philosophies and activities.

The number of government buildings affected was over thirty-three. However, for the sake of analysis, this figure will be used. Nine of the affected buildings are in Hong LGA which is more than 30% of the total affected buildings, which consisted of: the LGA secretariat, residential Quarters, Youth Centre, FERMA Office among others. Similarly, eight government buildings were affected in Gombi; a Prison, the residence and office of the District Head, Grain Warehouse and Fertilizer Warehouse to mention just a few. Maiha is third after Gombi, with six affected government structures.

Like Gombi LGA, the residence and office of the district head was affected. Also, just like Hong LGA, the Youth centre was affected. In addition to that, the residence of the LG chairman, presidential lodge and LG quarters were also affected. In Mubi South, the Chairman's lodge was the government building affected. The residence of the Emir of Mubi and the Prison were part of the affected government buildings in Mubi North. Michika and Madagali LGAs have five and three affected government buildings respectively. It included one LG Secretariat, three development area offices of Michika South, North and West and a store in Michika LGA and Madagali LGA, the LG Secretariat and two development areas of Shuwa and Madagali North. In the same way, the UNESCO World Heritage Site in Sukur, Madagali LGA was also attacked by the group, where they destroyed many monuments of historical significance. Important artefacts affected includes: the initiation room and other vernacular structures, portion of dry-stone enclosure walls and sacred throne of the Hidi. Others included, the gallery, 5 Eco lodges and paved stone walkway.<sup>46</sup> The group also destroyed primary school and properties in the host community.

With regards to banks, a total of eleven were damaged using bombs across the seven affected LGAs, with Mubi South having a total of seven banks damaged while, Mubi North<sup>47</sup>, Hong and Gombi<sup>48</sup> one bank each. In Mubi South, Lamorde Ward, six banks<sup>49</sup> were destroyed and looted, while Nasarawa ward recorded two<sup>50</sup>. Of all the affected banks in Mubi, only Diamond Bank was not rebuilt because it was just vandalised. The remaining eight banks were destroyed. UBA, GTB and Keystone Banks are yet to be rebuilt as at the time of my fieldwork in 2022. Although, UBA relocated to new premises, Zenith, Unity, First and Union Banks have rebuilt, while Sky Bank was the only bank that was not affected probably because of its location. It is

<sup>44</sup> Fred A. Olaoluwa, "A Study of the Impact of Boko Haram Terrorism on Inter-Group Relations in Michika Local Government Area of Adamawa State" M.A. ModibboAdama University of Technology, Yola, 2017 p. 51

<sup>45</sup> Fred A. Olaoluwa "A Study of the Impact of Boko Haram..." p. 52

<sup>46</sup> Interview with Anthony Sham 53years, Site Manager Sukur world Heritage Site, Yola, 27/08/2024

<sup>47</sup>Key Stone Bank

<sup>48</sup>The Banks in Gombi and Hong was First Bank

<sup>49</sup>Guarantee Trust Bank, Union Bank, First Bank, Zenith Bank, United Bank for Africa, and Unity Bank.

<sup>50</sup>Eco Bank and Diamond Bank

not located on the major road like the others. In Michika, three banks<sup>51</sup> were destroyed while one was affected in Madagali LGA, specifically in Gulak<sup>52</sup>. The observable pattern of attacks was that only commercial banks were affected probably because there was more liquidity in Commercial Banks than in Community Banks. Community banks were left intact like the ones in Hong, Madagali and Michika. As scholars have indicated, attacks on financial institutions is one of their major sources of funding which explains why almost all the banks were affected. It should be known that Wednesday 29<sup>th</sup> October, 2014 when the incidence happened was the day of the cattle market in Mubi when traders had taken money to deposit in banks. For instance, in Unity Bank Mubi, depositor's money that BH carted away was over eighteen million naira while money carted away from the vault was over sixty million.<sup>53</sup> It was also gathered that some of the moneys in First Bank Mubi, was evacuated by bank officials due to security report received earlier. In some cases, some bank officials carted away with money.<sup>54</sup>

The implication of this is that there was little or no liquidity for businesses in the areas, which to a very large extent affected trade coupled with the fact that business premises were adversely affected. For instance, trucks that conveyed goods to Mubi, Madagali, and Michika were reduced drastically. In the oil sector, a representative in the sector revealed that, oil pumps in Mubi, Madagali and Michika were destroyed. As a result, from two hundred (200) oil tankers per week before the crisis, it reduced to two (2) per week. Similarly, during the dry season, trucks conveying fertilizer were around one thousand (1000) before the crisis but dropped to one hundred and fifty (150) trucks. In addition, about one thousand (1000) trucks of food stuff per week usually left Gombe to Madagali but fell to 70 trucks.<sup>55</sup>

## Conclusions

The Boko Haram's Occupations of the Northern Adamawa Areas between, 2010-2015, and the aftereffects of which were extremely very profound, and as they were, multifaceted impacts on the Areas, left on their trails, blizzards of: both broad and specific, consequences, that have both turned back the Hands- Of The Clock, on some of the extremely modest and marginally appreciable degrees of 'Developments' in the Areas, the last Sixty (60), years.

The paper concludes, however, that, mired in various long standing, endemic and considerably evolved, challenges inherent in the Areas, namely; The broad and specific swathe of Crises, namely; The Crises of The State, The Crises of Governance, The Crises Development, The Crises of Democracy and Democratization, the crises Security and Securitization, the Crise of Poverty, as well as, of other Crises of Existential realities, resultant from the inabilities of the State, and by extension, the sub-State entities, to perform their respective roles and functions, coalesced, to enable the susceptibilities of the Areas to the tyrannies of the BH's' Insurrectionists and Insurgents Occupations of the Areas of Study. The unprecedented Destructions, are nonetheless, indicative of the massive negative implications of the Occupations, as the consequences have had on the Areas of Study.

Indeed, even though, Northern Adamawa, the Areas of our Study is not at epicenter of the 's Insurrectionists and insurgent's activities, the Areas experienced overwhelming degrees of significant losses of lives and properties, as well as, deteriorating social cohesion, as a consequence, also.

<sup>51</sup> First, Union and Agricultural Bank.

<sup>52</sup> First Bank

<sup>53</sup> Interview with a former staff of Unity Bank, 50 years, Mubi. 20/03/2023

<sup>54</sup> Interview with Anonymous person, 45 years Academic, Mubi, 29/12/2022

<sup>55</sup> Recovery and Peace Building Assessment Report, Vol. 2, 2016 p. 142

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This is to acknowledge the financial support of the Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) which was done via the Institutional Based Research (IBR) grant with the grant no. **TEFT/DR&D/UNI/MUBI/RG/2024/VOL.1**. The team also thank the Adamawa State University, Mubi and the Research and Innovation Directorate for their assistance.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Interviews

Abdulakeem Muhammed, 30 years, trader Mubi South, 26<sup>th</sup> February, 2020  
Alhaji Ali Yakamata, 56 years, Businessman, Bauchi, 29<sup>th</sup> February, 2020.  
Privilege Source, 45 years Academic, Mubi, 29/12/2022  
Anthony Sham 53years, Site Manager Sukur world Heritage Site, Yola, 27/08/2024  
Baba Abubakar 36 years, staff of FRSC an indigene of Michika, Mubi 11/07/2023  
Former staff of Unity Bank, 50 years, Mubi. 20/03/2023  
Ishaku Amos Melaluwa, 53 Years, Civil Servant, Wuro Patuji-Mubi. 27/01/2023  
Mallam Iliyasu Usman 37 years, Driver in Shuwa District, 10 October, 2019.  
Muhammed Kyari, 57 years, Academic Arewa House Kaduna, 10/03/2020  
Prince Zubeiru Ali Ijafaru, 49 years, District Head of Chakawa, Mubi, 20/02/2023  
Usman Mohammed Asarya, 49 Years, Exmember of BH, Madagali, 11/10/24  
Kabiru Salmana, 43 years, Exmember of BH, Madagali, 12/10/24  
Usman Musa 52 years, Trader, Mubi South 02/05/2018

### Archival Materials

ADSEMA: Final Report on Destruction in Adamawa State.  
ADSEMA: Guyaku Insurgence Attack in Gombi LGA February 2015.  
ADSEMA: Mubi North LGA Those Affected by Boko Haram Insurgency  
ADSEMA: Properties Destroyed by Boko Haram in Michika Vol. 1 2015  
Recovery and Peace Building Assessment Report, Vol. 2, 2016 p. 142

### Published Works

Abubakar K. M. and Ibrahim U. "Why Borno? The History, Geography and Sociology of Islamic Radicalization" in Abdul Raufu M. and Kate M. ed. *Overcoming Boko Haram: Faith, Society and Islamic Radicalization in Northern Nigeria*: Abuja, Premium Times Books., 2020 PP. 64-90  
Thurston, A. *Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018  
Douglas Barnabas and Nadir A. Nasidi. "A Micro Analysis of the Activities of Boko-Haram in North-Eastern Nigeria: A Case Study of Adamawa State, 2009-2015". *Journal of Humanities*, Kampala International. Vol. 7(1). 2022. Pp. 181-188  
Freedom O. Boko Haram and the Evolving Salafi Jihadist Threat in Nigeria" in Perouse M. M. (ed) *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and State in Nigeria*, Nigeria, African Studies 2014.  
Hansen, W.W. et al. 2016. "Poverty and Economic Deprivation Theory Street Children Qur'anic Schools/Almajirai and the Dispossessed as the sources of Recruitment for Boko Haram and other Religious, Political and Criminal Groups in Northern Nigeria" In *Perspective on Terrorism* Vol. 10 (5) October 2016 pp. 83-95  
Kyari M. "The Origin of Boko Haram" in A. Carl levan and Patrick Utaka ed. *The Oxford Handbook of Nigeria Politics*: United Kingdom, Oxford University Press, 2018. PP. 583-604



- Kyari M. "The Massacre and Methods of Boko Haram" Perouse M. M. (ed) *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and State in Nigeria*, Nigeria, African Studies.
- Portia R. "Framing and Blaming: Discourse analysis of Boko Haram Uprising, July 2009", Perouse M. M. (ed) *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and State in Nigeria*, Nigeria, African Studies.

### Unpublished Works

- Bleambo P. K. and Lagu S. A. (ed.) *Mubi Exodus: Adamawa State University Experience. Mubi*. Unpublished Manuscript.
- Fred A. Olaoluwa. 2017. "A Study of the Impact of Boko Haram Terrorism on Inter-Group Relations in Michika Local Government Area of Adamawa State" M.A. Modibbo Adama University of Technology, Yola.
- Mustapha Gwadabe. 2014. "Islam, Izala and Boko Haram Dispute in Northern Nigeria: A Historical Perspective" Department of History, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Seminar Series.

### Online Sources

- <http://www.saharareporters.com/2014/08/23boko-haram-insurgents-overrun-madagali-local-government-adamawa-state>. Retrieved 8<sup>th</sup> September, 2024
- <http://leadership.ng/news/381881/boko-haram-takes-madagali-adamawa-villages>. Accessed 14<sup>th</sup> September, 2024.
- <http://leadership.ng/news/381881/boko-haram-takes-madagali-adamawa-villages>. Accessed 14<sup>th</sup> September, 2024.